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Summary  findings
Faruqee and Carey review the literature on land markets  Misguided land reform in the past has made tenancy
in South Asia to clarify what's known and to highlight  unattractive  to landowners, so large capital-intensive
unresolved issues. They report that:  farms have developed. Political economic analysis is
* We have a good understanding of why  needed to explain the failure of past land reform, as well
sharecropping persists and why it can be superior to  as distortions in agricultural input and output markets in
other standard agricultural contracts. We have less  South Asia.
understanding of what determines the relative efficiency  Land fragmentation  (as distinguished from farm
of sharecropping in different environments and why  size) has caused productivity losses. Those losses have
other apparently superior contractual relationships are  not been quantified and the reasons fragmentation
rare.  persists are poorly understood.
* Insecure rights to land adversely affect production  * Transaction  costs are a significant impediment to
and investment incentives in areas outside of South Asia,  functioning land markets. In South Asia, transfers of land
but in South Asia strong evidence linking investment and  rights are complicated by lack of explicit title to land,
rights to production  is scarce.  and by informal and customary rights.
*  An inverse relationship between farm size and  *  One pressing research problem is gender
output per unit area is a recurrent feature in data from  discrimination, an important factor in land market
South Asia, apparently related to land-labor interactions.  imperfections - especially (within the household) the
- Although small farms seem to be more efficient than  separation of land management and its control.
large ones, small farmers have trouble raising their  Research needs include more systematic regional
profitability and enlarging their holding, largely because  comparisons, the use of more panel data, and an
of credit constraints but also because of poverty and  investigation of how agricultural productivity is affected
policy that discriminates against them.  by gender problems and land fragmentation.
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Section  I: Introduction
Our goal in this paper  is to distill  the vast literature  on land  markets  in South  Asia into
what we see as the key  lessons,  and the major unresolved  issues.  Our focus on the land  market
arises because  the land  market  is central  to three  desirable  policy  goals in agriculture:  improving
the efficiency  of the agriculture  sector,  raising  the return  to agricultural  labor, and facilitating  exit
of those  who  will be more  productive  elsewhere  in the economy  from  the agriculture  sector.  Access
to land is highly  correlated  with poverty  throughout  South  Asia. A review  of the experience
throughout  Asia leads  Quibria  and Srinivasan  (1993)  to conclude  that:
In sunmmary,  it would  appear  that among  those  who cultivate  land, poverty  arises
more  from an unequal  distribution  of operational  holdings  rather  than from lack of
access  to new  technology,  irrigation,  fertilizers,  etc. on the part of small  farmers
and tenants.  (page  52)
The return  to labor  in agriculture  has to be increased  since  a significant  proportion  of the
rural poor are agricultural  laborers  or small peasants,  a large  proportion  of whose  incomes  is
derived  from supply  of family  labor  to their own farms or to the local  labor market. Small
peasants  and the landless  require  the means  to move  up the economic  ladder,  and land is essential
to this mobility. In the Pakistan  Integrated  Household  Survey  of 1991,  56 per cent of agricultural
laborers  were classified  as poor, while  44 per cent  of tenants  were  thus classified. These  groups
combined accounted for 29 per cent of all rural poor in Pakistan.  In India, agricultural labor
households accounted for nearly 46 per cent of all rural households below the poverty line in 1988,
while foming  a 31 per cent share of all rural households. These households accounted for 60 per
cent of total unemployed person-days.'
On the other hand, over time labor has to be shifted away from agricultural to more
productive non-agricultural occupations.  Poverty reduction and labor mobility require skill
accumulation, and efficient  entry and exit from agriculture requires an active and efficient land
market.  Skill accumulation in tum means that incomes from cultivation and agricultural labor
have to grow and the crucial role of a well-functioning land market in this dynamic process can
hardly be overemphasized. In effect, the land market should solve a land-labor matching problem,
coupling  the labor of landless laborers and tenants with land that they can operate to generate
remunerative economic  opportunities.
The importance of the land market is often stressed in cross-country comparisons of
economic performance. Land reform and/or a pre-existing equitable land distribution are seen as
key ingredients of dynamic agricultural sectors and in turn of the overall success of the high-
performing Asian economies. 2 On a within-region basis, there also appears be an association
between land distribution and efficiency.  It has been suggested that the difference in performance
between Punjab, Pakistan and Punjab, India can be ascribed to differences in barriers to access to
land, with more equitable land distribution indicating easier access to land in India (Sims, 1988).
Gaynor and Putterman (1993) use evidence from China's decollectivization  to show that more
See  Quibria  (1994),  Chapter  2.
2  See  World  Bank (1993).
1egalitarian  land redistribution  was associated  with  higher  productivity.  Of course,  this does not
imply  that land  redistribution  is a pre-condition  for improved  agricultural  performance;  land
distribution  is perhaps  best interpreted  as a proxy  for access  to land.
It is worthwhile  briefly  discussing  what a theory  based on well-functioning  markets  would
say about  the significance  of access  to land. The demand  for agricultural  land is relatively
straightforward,  and should  depend  principally  on land  quality  and  the local (not individual)
endowment  of complementary  inputs to agricultural  production:  labor,  managerial  services,  draft
power, and water,  to name  the most important. In the presence  of markets  for these  services,
agricultural  transactions  would  be simple  to characterize. Someone  would  rent  the required
services  on appropriate  spot markets  and combine  them with  land  to produce  agricultural  output.
In a competitive  market  with constant  returns  to scale,  no particular  significance  would  attach  to
land-ownership  or the size  of an operated  holding. Factor  proportions  and marginal  productivities
would  be equalized  and there  should  be no relationship  between  individual  factor endowments  and
efficiency.
We have  good reason  to believe  that the allocation  of land  does  not take this form in
practice. While  one can quarrel  with the details of any individual  study,  there is a surfeit  of
evidence  pointing  to systematic  variations  in efficiency  of land  use across contract  types,
allocations  of rights, size  and composition  of holding,  and gender. These  outcomes  in tum can be
collectively  traced to a list of sources  such as missing  markets,  transactions  costs,  asymmetric
information,  politico-economic  and sociological  influences. In our discussion,  we attempt  to
impose  some  structure  on  these outcomes  and sources;  this is organized  around (an of course
somewhat  arbitrary)  division  into  eight broad topics.
Section II: Outcomes  and Source of Imperfections
(1) We have a good understanding  of why sharecropping  persists  and why it can be superior to
other standard  agricultural  contracts. We have less understanding  of the determinants  of the
relative  efficiency  of sharecropping  in different  environments,  and of why other apparently
superior  contractualforms  are rarely observed.
For any plot of land,  we can think  of three ways  the plot  can be operated:  owner-operation
with family  or hired  labor,  lease, or sharecropping.  Many studies  find an efficiency  loss  in
sharecropping  relative  to owner-operated  plots [Shaban  (1987),  and Binswanger,  Deininger,  and
Feder (1993)]. This likely  arises from the classic  inefficiency  ofthe share contract  (with imperfect
monitoring)  versus  the fixed  rental contract  or full ownership.  The  apparent  inefficiency  of share
tenancy  was a major  motivating  force  behind  land reforms  all over  Asia (Otsuka, 1993). However,
the use of sharecropping  can be rationalized  from the perspective  of a principal-agent  model,  where
the principal  (the  land-owner)  can observe  the output  but not the labor supply  of the tenant.  In
this case, fixed  wage  employment  would  not provide  the agent  with any work incentives,  while
fixed-rent  lease  would  result  in the agent  absorbing  all the risk. The  type of contract  that actually
emerges  would  depend  on the  tradeoff  between  the need  to provide  incentives  and share risk, and
the possibilities  are summarized  in Table 1.
2Table 1: Optimal Contract By Type of Environment
Ability  to Monitor  and  Risk Sharing?
Enforce  Effort?
_________________________________y  es  N o
Yes  Fixed Wage  |  Fixed  Wage
No  Sharecropping  Lease
Note: These  results  apply  for the  standard  formulation  of  the  principal-agent  problem  with  a risk  neutral
principal  and  a risk-averse  or risk  neutral  agent;  for an exposition  that  delivers  these  results,  see  Mas-
Colell,  Whinston,  and Green  (1995).
It is important  to note  that we use the term sharecropping  in the broadest  sense  to mean
any scheme  which  makes  the agent's compensation  a function  of output;  this clearly  encompasses
far more  than the linear  50:50  sharing  rule which  is usually  observed. In addition,  a principal
agent  model  will not necessarily  deliver  the result  that "too little"  effort  is supplied  in the
sharecropping  case; the concept  of efficiency  that applies in these  models  also differs  greatly  from
its usual empirical  counterpart.
In practice  however,  this framework  is too simplistic  to explain  features  of agricultural
markets;  a more  appealing  general  framework  is outlined  in Eswaran  and Kotwal  (1985)  from
which  we borrow  in this section. Two problems  in particular  with  the analysis  can be highlighted.
First, the ability  to supervise  is rarely  of the "yes or no" form  presented  above;  typically  the
principal  does have  the ability  to supervise,  but with some cost. Second,  some  evidence  shows  that
risk-sharing  per se (as opposed  to access  to financial  markets)  has little  influence  on contracts  in
practice,  and provides  little  rationale  for the 50:50 contract  (or  the limnited  range  of standardized
share contracts)  that is usually  observed. 3 An additional  possibility  is that the sharecropping
contract  is chosen  not because  it is the best contract,  but because  of legal constraints  on a more
efficient  contract. We  discuss  this further  below.
Contractual  structure  in agriculture  is determiined  by the interplay  between  two offsetting
forces:  family  farmers  are more  able to monitor  and supervise  labor  supply,  while  land  owners
have  better access  to financial  markets  and may also have  better managerial  skills. One  important
source of managerial  skills  arises from land-owners'  knowledge  of, and access  to, the agricultural
subsidy  regime, price  policies,  and support  services  (research  and extension)  of the government.
South  Asian countries  have  had elaborate  agricultural  intervention  policies  in the past that are now
being  dismantled;  this may  be an important  source of changes  in endowments  and dynamics  in the
framework  we outline.
Tenants  possess  a supervision  advantage,  while  landlords  have  a managerial  skills
advantage.  Both therefore  are subject  to moral  hazard, because  they  will  underprovide  their  non-
marketed  skill in any arrangement  that does  not face them  with appropriate  incentives:  fixed  wage
employment  will cause  underprovision  of labor supervision,  while  fixed-rent  lease  will  cause
underprovision  of management.  Eswaran and Kotwal  propose  that the optimal  solution  to this
problem  may be a partnership  between  the landlord  and tenant in which  each share  the proceeds
from the land. However,  this partnership,  according  to them,  suffers  from  the Marshallian
efficiency  loss,  so the actual  outcome  depends  on the relative  endowment  of supervision  and
managerial  skills as well  as the costs of the sharecropping  contract. The  likely  outcomes  in this
3 Sharma  and  Dreze  (1990)  argue  that  the 50:50  shares  are  not as puzzling  as  many  people  think.
Hurwicz  and Shapiro  provide  a model  in which  50:50  sharing  is optimal.
3case are summarized  in Table 2. The general  principle  is that the supplier  of whichever  input  is
particularly  important  be made  the residual  claimant,  so that when  management  is relatively
important,  we should  see the  fixed  wage contract,  and when  supervision  is relatively  important  we
should  see the fixed  rental contract. Sharecropping  emerges  when  there  is a need  to make  both
parties  residual  claimants,  particularly  when  relative  endowments  of both types of skill are low.
Table 2: Optimal Contract By Relative  Efficiency  of Landlord and Tenant
Tenant's Relative  Landlord's  Relative  Supervision  Skills
Manageirial  Skills
Low  |  High
High  Lease  | Fixed  Wage or Lease
Low  Sharecroppin  Fixed Wale
Source:  Eswaran  and  Kotwal  (1985)
The implications  of this analysis  for the relative  efficiency  of different  types of contract  are
again  not clear-cut. Since  the sharecropping  contract  allows  a better  combination  of management
and supervision  than other  contracts  under  certain  circumstances,  it may  actually  be more  efficient
than  the other contractual  forms. This can explain  why  there  have  been  different  findings  on the
efficiency  on contracts  from  different  regions. It would  be extremely  useful  if variations  in the
relative  efficiency  of sharecropping  across  regions  could  be linked  more  closely  to variations  in the
characteristics  of those  regions. It is possible  that, depending  on the environrnent,  investment  in
land by the owner  (as well  as work  effort)  can be constrained  by the type  of contract  governing  the
operation  of the land;  for instance  a landlord  may be reluctant  to adopt  an innovation  on
sharecropped  land (Stiglitz,  1986),  because  it may adversely  affect  the labor supply  decision  of the
sharecropper,  from  the landlord's  perspective.
Agricultural  policy  reforms  have changed  the comparative  advantages  of landlords  and
tenants,  and will  have  predictable  influences  on contract  choice  according  to this model. Policy
distortions  (subsidies,  support  prices)  made  sharecropping  more  attractive,  as these  distortions  are
removed,  sharecropping  should  diminish  in importance.
Eswaran  and Kotwal  show  that a sharing  contract  can  be optimal  within  a broad  paramneter
range. However,  they assume  that the share contract  is linear and based  only on the output  from
the plot in question.  Even  if one accepts  that the linear contract  has obvious  convenience,  one can
still  wonder  why  the contract  is not linked  to other  variables  that would  provide  sharper  incentives
for the tenant. For instance,  tenants  could  receive  additional  payment  for production  in excess of
average  output  on  the landlord's  plots or in the village  as whole. In financial  and legal firms,  the
compensation  of each  partner  is based on total firm  output,  with bonuses  for exceptional
performance.  However,  since  tenancy  contracts  tend  to be renewed  annually,  a comparison  with
output  on other  plots is surely  implicit  on the decision  whether  or not to renew  the contract. This
of itself  does not improve  the efficiency  of the sharecropping  contract;  for if output  was higher  on
fixed-rent  plots, it would  be hard to see why  the share contract  was  adopted  in the first place;  while
a comparison  with  other  sharecropping  contracts  may eliminate  inefficiency  due a poor quality
tenant,  it need  not eliminate  the Marshallian  inefficiency  inherent  in the contract.
Bell,  Raha,  and Srinivasan  (1995)  find that matching  behavior  by landlords  and tenants
mitigates,  but by no means  eliminates,  the agency  problems  in sharecropping  contracts. This is
indicative  of a more  general  principle  that informal  or implicit  arrangements  may significantly  alter
4the nature of the observed  contract. This in tum suggests  a role  for regional  factors  in the
performance  of the sharecropping  contract, Indeed,  this exercise  is undertaken  in a limited,
qualitative  sense  by Bell  et al (1994)  in a comparison  of the efficiency  of sharecropping  in Bihar
and Punjab,  India's poorest  and richest  states. They find  that the sharecropping  contract
performed  no worse  (relatively)  in Bihar than  in Punjab;  it clearly  would  be usefal  to expand  this
comparison  to cover  more  regions,  allowing  a more  systematic  investigation.
It should  be noted  that the fixed-rent  contract  which  is normally  thought  of as "efficient"  is
not without  problems  either. An important  practical consideration  in lease  contracts  is the
question  of whether  the rent is due in advance  or can be paid  in arrears. 4 If the rent is due in
arrears,  then  the tenant is effectively  leveraged,  opening  the way for the imperfections  that leverage
can entail. To establish  this point,  it is necessary  to clarify  the precise  details  of the contract  in
states of the world  where  the tenant can't pay the agreed-upon  rent. If the  landlord  becomes  the
residual  claimant  in this case,  the tenant  faces distorted  incentives  on two fronts. First, if the
tenant has some  choice  over  the riskiness  of production  processes,  he has an incentive  to choose
more risky  projects,  because  he reaps the gains when  the process  is successful  while  the landlord
bears the loss when  the project  fails. Second,  (and perhaps  more  plausible  in the South  Asian
context),  if the tenant knows  that exogenous  conditions  are going  to make  it difficult  for him  to
meet the rental payment,  effort  will  be undersupplied  in such situations. If bad weather  or pests
mean  that crop output  will  be low, and most  of the output is going  to landlord  in the form of rent
anyway,  then  the tenant faces  poor incentives  in this case. The  "inefficient"  sharecropping  contract
offers  better incentives  to the tenant  in both cases. This suggests  that in the presence  of default
risk and constraints  on payment  in advance,  sharecropping  may be more  likely  to occur. Shetty
(1988)  presents a model  of limited  liability  of tenants where  sharecropping  does  indeed  emerge  as a
solution  to these  problems.
(2) Theory and evidence  from elsewhere suggests that insecure rights to land adversely affects
production and investment incentives.  However, strong evidence linking rights to production
and investment is scarce  for South Asia despite significant regional variation within the sub-
continent.
There  is a reasonable  belief  that insecure  title  to land or lack of security  of tenure  will
affect  production  and investment  incentives.  Investment  in the land  will  almost  certainly  not be
efficient  when  title is insecure;  an additional  problem  is the diversion  of resources  into  legal
disputes  about a plot of land. However,  operational  differences  arising  from  tenure status  may be
quite  small:  even  tenants  who  lack security  of tenure may  have  good reason  to believe  that they will
retain  their plot for a substantial  period  of time, due to an ongoing  relationship  with  the owner  or
informal  rights as a member  of a community.  Thus de jure differences  in tenure  status may  have
little  defacto significance.  Communal  land rights systems  also often  function  quite  well  in
providing  effective  security  of tenure  without  having  a formal  system  of land  titles.
Empirical  work  on  tenure and efficiency  has been  plagued  by a basic identification
problem. The nature of this problem  is nicely  stated  by Carter  and Olinto  (1996):
...the  property  rights  regime  under which  an individual  is observed  to work  is itself
an endogenous  variable,  chosen  by the individual  who must invest  real resources
4 The  most  common  type  of  arrears  contract  specifies  that  the rent  is payable  in kind  after  a given  harvest.
5to secure and maintain the legally recognized  property rights to the land.  The
property rights regime  is thus likely to be systematically  related  to a number of
productivity  relevant  characteristics  which are notoriously  hard to measure.
Regardless  of the  interpretation  of the evidence,  governments  have  often  been  tempted  to
regulate  the land rental  market,  with the goal of providing  security  of tenure  for tenants  or
eliminating  share  tenancy. When  not carefully  designed,  these  policies  have  had the perverse
effects  outlined  below,  but there  have  also been  successes. At the same  time, carefully  designed
empirical  studies  have  improved  our understanding  of the links  between  tenure  and efficiency.
While  a static productivity  differential  can be difficult  to interpret,  there is evidence  that an
improvement  in land  rights  is associated  with greater efficiency. Lin (1992)  shows  that the
dominant  source of output  growth  in Chinese  agriculture  during 1978-1984  was  the change  from
collective-team  large  fanns to individual  household-based  farming  (despite  the often  small size  of
household  plots).  Feder  etal  (1988)  demonstrated  a link  between  title ownership  on the one hand,
and access  to credit and land  improvements  on the other. Strong  evidence  for the South  Asian case
is provided  by Banerijee  and Ghatak  (1996). Using  district-level  data, they show  that a program  of
voluntary  tenant registration,  with registration  giving  the tenant  certain  rights,  had dramatic  effects
on productivity  in West  Bengal  from the late 1970s  onwards.
The evidence  that land  rights may  affect investment  incentives  is more speculative,  though
there are abundant  theoretical  reasons  to believe  that this is the case. Besley  (1994)  presents  three
reasons  why insecure  land  rights should  affect investment  incentives:  fear of expropriation,  credit
access  and collateral  (the  key mechanism  in the Feder  et al study),  and lack of trading
opportunities. Besley  presents  evidence  that land  rights are positively  related  to investment  in two
samples  from Ghana. Lack of trading  opportunities  deserves  further  discussion  given  our focus on
the land  market. The  idea  here  is that improved  land  rights make  it easier  to sell or rent  land; since
investment  in land  raises  the value of land upon sale  or rental, a farmer  with better  land rights  and
anticipating  the possibility  of sale or rental  will be more  likely  to invest  in improvements  to land.
This argument  would  apply  equally  well  to the functioning  of the land  market  given  land  rights.  A
farmer  anticipating  the possibility  of having  to dispose  of land  is more  likely  to undertake  value-
enhancing  investments  in land  if the land  market will  appropriately  reward  him for these
investments  upon disposal. Besley  calls this the "gains from  trade" view,  and such  gains are a
clear consequence  of a well-functioning  land-market.
As we noted  earlier,  evidence  of the influence  of land  rights on investment  is scarce  in the
South  Asian case;  without  such  evidence  we cannot  weight  the relative  irnportance  of land rights
and wealth  in constraining  investment.  Besley  (1994)  notes an additional  possibility:  that land
rights  may be endogenous.  Farmers may  invest  in land  over which  they  have  insecure  title, in order
to solidify  their claim. If this is the case, farmers  may  find it difficult  to make such  investments  if
their incomes  are low,  weakening  their claim  to title.  Such  behavior  is particularly  likely  under
conmmunity  ownership  of land. Since  community  ownership  usually  comes  with inability  to
transfer,  this might  be seen  as reducing  investment.  However,  within-community  allocation
mechanisms  may  be sufficient  for most purposes.
Recent  studies  in Latin America  have  provided  some  evidence  on the relative  importance  of
the different  channels  linking  rights  to productivity.  These  studies  focus  on land-titling  programs
which  of course  is not the only  kind of land  rights policy  that could  be considered.  Panel  data
evidence  from Honduras  (Lopez,  1996)  and Paraguay  (Carter  and Olinto,  1996)  suggests  that by
6reducing  the fear of expropriation,  titling  programs  have strong  effects  on land-specific
investments.  Titling  programs  also appear  to reduce  credit  constraints,  but this effect is more
selective. Farmers  who  are on the margin  of access  to credit  within  the existing  structure  of capital
market imperfections  are helped  by gaining  title  to their land,  but the more  severely  constrained
farners are not.
It is important  that investrnent  be interpreted  broadly  to include  the notion  of
sustainability;  to the extent  that ongoing  deterioration  in the quality  of a field  can be traced to
private actions  (as opposed  to externalities  such as drainage),  this should  be considered  as
disinvestment  in the field. South  Asian  agriculture  is experiencing  an array of environmental
problems  and we have little  evidence  on the role  that the allocation  of land  rights  plays in these
problems.
(3) The existence  of an inverse  relationship  between  farm size and output  per unit  area is
a recurrent  feature in data  from South  Asia.  The source of this relationship  appears  to lie in
land-labor  interactions.
The most common  view  of the difference  between  small  and large  farns is the "inverse
relationship"  between  farm size  and productivity:  that yields  on small  farms are  higher  than yields
on large farms, giving  a negative  relationship  between  land size  and productivity. While  there are
well  known  problems  with using  yield  as a measure  of efficiency,  the relationship  is also typically
found in cross-sectional  comparisons  of net profitability. Even  this approach  does  not directly  get
at the question  of economic  efficiency;  Binswanger  (1994)  finds  a direct efficiency  relationship
between  size and performance  because  he uses a net profitability  measure  that takes account  of the
different  production  techniques  chosen  by small  and large farmers. Since  large farmers  can
diversify  risk more  easily  than  small  farmers,  they are less risk averse  and come  cluser  to
maximizing  expected  net  profitability  than  small farmers. Despite  this, levels  of risk in the
farmers' environment  in Binswanger's  sample  were rarely  if ever sufficiently  high that large
farmers  actually  outperformed  small  farmers. This is consistent  with the relationship  usually
found in the data.
The key to the size-efficiency  relationship  is generally  believed  to lie in hired  labor,  though
Benjamin  (1995)  presents  indirect  evidence  pointing  to mismeasured  land  quality. In the absence
of perfect  monitoring,  hired  labor  will  have an incentive  to "shirk",  i.e. reduce  work  effort. The
employer  cannot  respond  to this by reducing  the wage, either  because  of a low  wage would  reduce
effort  through  nutritional  or morale  considerations,  or because  the worker  has an outside
opportunity  (usually  migration)  which  sets a minimum  reservation  wage which  the employer  must
provide. Thus farmers  will  prefer  to rely  on family  labor, which  can  be supervised  at low cost.
Small  family  farms will  thus be most efficient.
If this was the sole  consideration  determining  farm size,  the market  solution  is likely  to be
an operational  size holding  which  can be cultivated  by the family. Nevertheless,  family  labor
supply  will  be unlikely  to meet  farrn  labor demand  at all times of the year, notably  harvest  time.
Thus casual or seasonal  labor  will  be required  at such times. The flexibility  of the rural labor
supply  will  therefore  be an important  influence  on the efficiency  of the agriculture  sector. If the
outside  opportunities  of rural  laborers  are sufficiently  remunerative,  such  labor  may  be difficult  to
find. Cultural  factors  can  further  constrain  rural labor supply  by requiring  that women  can only
work  on their own  family  farms. The prevalence  of peak labor shortages  and gender  restrictions
should  therefore  influence  the farm size  adjustment  decisions  of households. An active  land
7market is essential  in facilitating  this size  adjustment,  and the outcome  we would  expect  to see
would  be moderate  size  family  farms - sufficiently  profitable  to induce  family  members  to remain
on the land,  but not so large  as to create  a large reliance  on inadequately  supervised  wage labor.
It seems  unlikely  that South  Asia, with its large  numbers  of extremely  small  farms can be
meeting  this benchmark. Thailand,  by contrast,  seems  to deal with  the peak  labor shortage  issue
in a more  efficient  fashion. One  study (World  Bank, 1983)  estimated  that virtually  all of the
seasonal  increase  in employment  in Thailand's  agriculture  sector  was accounted  for by unpaid
family  workers,  who  enter  and exit the labor force  in conjunction  with labor requirements  in
agriculture. Thus rural  labor  supply  in Thailand  is closely  matched  to the demand  for agricultural
labor  - a match that is facilitated  when  land  is operated  on an appropriately  adjusted  family  farm
basis.
(4) Despite their  greater apparent  efficiency,  smallfarmers  face great difficulty  in
raising their  profitability  or expanding  their holding  size. Credit  constraints  appear  to be the
biggest  single obstacle  but a discriminatory  policy regime  and  poverty have  also  played a major
role.
If smallholders  are  more  efficient  than farmers  with large  holdings  in most circumstances,
the question  then  is: why  does  the  land market  not re-allocate  land  to farmers  with smaller
holdings?  We can also ask why  marginal  farms continue  to exist  throughout  South  Asia: one
would  expect  a marginal  farmer  to either  expand  his plot or exit  the agriculture  sector  completely.
It is often  stated  that smallholders  face a daunting  array of problems;  from inadequate  farm size,
access  to inputs and services  etc. Each of these  claims  requires  careful  scrutiny. For instance,
while  small land  size  is typically  mentioned  as a constraint  on productivity,  it cannot  be assumed
that small  farms are intrinsically  not viable. The case of China  provides  a compelling
counterexample  to the view  that small  farms  per se constrain  the performance  of agriculture.:
The leading  constraint  faced  by smallholders  is access  to financial  markets. The evidence
from South  Asia indicates  while  there was a vast expansion  in institutional  credit  provision  to
agriculture,  little  of this credit  reached  smallholders  and most disbursement  is concentrated  on vefy
large  farms.  This is typically  attributed  to difficulties  in collateralizing  holdings  with  insecure  title
(transfer  rights),  or smallholders'  inability  to appropriate  the rents from rationed  credit. It is
smallholders'  lack of access  to financial  markets  that underlies  their greater  degree  of risk aversion
in Binswanger's  study. Binswanger  finds  that the inability  of smallholders  to diversify  risk is
manifested  in the choice  of non-profit  maximizing  portfolios;  in this sense,  smallholders  are less
efficient  than farmers  with  large  holdings. An increase  in the assets  of smallholders  (e.g. land)
would  enhance  their ability  to absorb risk, and would  improve  their  efficiency.  This argument  has
been  used  to support  the case  for land reform  but of course other  policies  (such  as improved  credit
market  access)  could  have  a similar  imnpact.
Smallholders  would  likely  face difficulties  in access  to credit  even  in a credit  market
operating  without  institutional  or government  failure. Lenders  will  face high  transactions  costs in
dealing  with smallholders,  and lenders  will  be generally  reluctant  to lend  to marginal  farmers
because  of seasonality  and  cross-section  correlation  in default  risk. In practice,  smallholders  will
need  to self-finance  projects  or at least take substantial  equity  participation  in the project;  since
S See  Binswanger  (1994)  and  Lin (1992).
6  For  India,  see  Binswanger  and Khandker,  1993.  For  Pakistan,  see  Malik.
8there is no guarantee  that the most able farmers  will  have such equity  available,  an inefficiency  will
emerge. Credit  market  imperfections  can be overcome  by interlinked  transactions. Bell and
Srinivasan  (1989)  find that interlinked  transactions  are an important  characteristic  of agriculture
even in commercialized  Punjab,  where  the "feudal"  view of such transactions  is presumably  least
tenable. In particular,  transactions  between  a farmer  and the trader or commission  agent  to whom
he sells his product  were very  common. Such  arrangements  may  provide  farmers  with working
capital or a reduction  in risk;  the nature and extent  of these transactions  warrants  further  study.
Lack of access  to credit  can be compounded  by other  imperfections.  The agricultural  land
market may fail the basic  test of an efficient  market:  that the price of land equal  the discounted
value of future agricultural  profits.  When  this condition  fails,  the ability  of smallholders  to
purchase  land is called  into  question. Such farmers  will  need  to access  the credit  market  to finance
land  purchases,  since  they  usually  lack farm savings. They  are thus relying  on the future
agricultural  profits  to pay back  any loans  they  take out to finance  land  purchase. However,  this
strategy  is undercut  if some  policy  distortion  makes  the land  more  valuable  to a large  farmer  than
the debt-service  burden  that a small  farmer  running  the land could  sustain. The policy  distortion
becomes  capitalized  into  the price  of land,  putting  it beyond  the reach  of the smallholder.  A related
problem  is that different  farmers  may discount  profits at different  rates, because  credit  market
imperfections  result  in each  facing  different  interest  rates.
Within  the realm of credit  constraints,  one can ask whether  low assets  and tenure
insecurity  or low agricultural  prices  have  presented  a greater impediment  to investment.  The  case
of China  shows  that generating  increased  agricultural  incomes  through  higher  output  prices  can
itself  be an important  spur to growth,  suggesting  a link  between  income  and investment.  Economic
theory  in fact suggests  that increasing  incomes  could  greatly improve  access  to credit. This is
because  in credit-rationed  environments,  the  wealth  of potential  borrowers  is a key determinant  of
access  to credit.  As price  policy  reforms  make  it easier  for small  farmers  to self-finance  projects,
the collateral  constraint  on farmers  diminishes  in importance.  The question  in this case  is whether
smallholders  are better  helped  by providing  them with more  assets or security  of  tenure (via  a land
reform),  or with higher  incomes.7
It goes without  saying  that since  small  farmers  are often  poor farmers,  they  face
constraints  on many  different  fronts. In the Pakistan  Integrated  Household  Survey  of 1991,  even
amongst  rural households  classified  as owner-cultivators,  there was a poverty  headcount  of 30 per
cent. In India for 1988,  32 per cent of all poor rural households  were self-employed  in agricultural
occupations. This poverty  is presumably  associated  with low levels  of on-farm  investment  even  in
the presence  of ownership  rights. While  of course  we cannot  say from a single  cross-section
whether  the rural poor are chronically  impoverished,  the PIHS did find that the poor had
significantly  lower  levels  of education  than other  groups,  suggesting  that poverty  tends  to be highly
persistent  across  time. The fact  that the poverty  measure  is based on consumption  (rather  than
income)  also suggests  that the households  classified  as poor in 1991  are highly  likely  to be
classified  as poor in other  years as well. Thus small cultivators  contain  a large  group  of the
permanently  poor. This may  imply  that relatively  straightforward  poverty  reducing  policies  (such
as raising  income)  may be particularly  effective  in raising  on-farm  investment.  Conversely,  a
7  The  question  of agricultural  incomes  is particularly  relevant  since  agricultural  incomes  are often
squeezed  in the  short-term  by  economy-wide  liberalization.  In particular,  input  prices  tend  to rise  and the
real  exchange  rate  appreciates,  hurting  the  export-dependent  agriculture  sector.  The  impact  of a land
reform  on investment  incentives  could  this  be greatly  diluted,  at least  in the short-run.
9program  of agricultural  liberalization  that reduces  agricultural  income,  if only in the short-term,
could  severely  constrain  the investment  response  of smallholders.
A related  area which  ties  together  land  and labor interactions  as well  as constraints  faced
by smallholders  is that of land  and demographic  interactions.  South  Asia is generally  characterized
by large  family size  amongst  smallholders  and the landless. 8 This partly reflects  the decision  of
resource-poor  farmers  with  little access  to financial  markets  to use family  labor supply  as the best
route  to increased  income.  However,  large  family  size constrains  human  capital  accumulation  per
head  within  the family,  and so may damnages  the family's chances  of rising  out of poverty. In
addition,  inheritance  problems  are compounded,  underlying  the land fragmentation  problem
discussed  below. Over  the longer-term,  we expect  both family  size  and land-holdings  to adjust in
response  to these  and other  influences.
A related  question  concerns  the competitiveness  of different  types of farn in the liberalized
environment.  Shearer  et al (1990)  point  out that the type  of farm  that has tended  to emerge  in the
liberalized  agricultural  sectors  of Latin America  is the capitalized  famnily  farm; large enough  to
overcome  capital market  constraints  but small enough  to have  efficient  labor  supervision.  These
farms tend  to have  high  capital-land  and capital-labor  ratios and thus absorb  little  outside  labor.
Whether  this reflects  the truly  efficient  outcome  or the continued  existence  of distortions  that favor
large farms is not clear.
A related  point  is that the traditional  interpretation  of the inverse  relationship  as reflecting
a supervision  constraint  can be misleading  in the presence  of other  constraints  and imperfections.
A particularly  striking  illustration  of this possibility  is provided  by Kevane  (1996). The  key to his
study  is that he has data where  wealth  and landownership  are  not strongly  correlated,  so that he can
disentangle  the effect  of wealth  on agricultural  production. He presents  a model  featuring
imperfections  in land rental  markets,  credit  markets,  insurance3,  and labor  markets,  and shows  that
there  is a possibility  of a positive  relationship  between  wealth  or size and yields  even  when a
supervision  constraint  alone  would  favor small  farms. The mechanism  is as follows:  wealthier
farmers  have  less need  to engage  in off-farm  labor, so the amount  of labor  available  for
agricultural  production  is higher. However,  because  of rental market  imperfections,  they  are
unable  to fully  match  this labor  with additional  land, so that labor input  per unit land rises  for
wealthier  farmers. He finds  that the predicted  positive  relationship  between  wealth  and
productivity  is indeed  present  in a village  in Sudan.
Another  example  of how  wealth  can confound  seemingly  straightforward  empirical
implications  comes  from a study  of institutional  factors and agricultural  productivity  in two
Chinese  provinces. Yao (1996)  treats tenure  insecurity  as an additional  source  of risk to farmers,
so its impact  on productivity  depends  on the ability  of farmers  to bear additional  risk. This is tum
varies  with wealth,  which  suggests  that the relationship  between  tenure  insecurity  and productivity
and productivity  will  be weaker  in wealthier  areas. This finding  is confirmed.
8Lanjouw  and  Ravallion  (1995)  caution  that  the  poverty-household  size  relationship  cannot  be properly
interpreted  without  taking  account  of economies  of size in consumption.  With a plausible  accounting  for
economnies  of size,  the  size-poverty  relationship  actually  disappears  for  a household  sample  in Pakistan.
9 The  effect  of insurance  market  imperfections  is that  fanners  maximize  expected  utility  with  a risk
averse  utility  function  rather  than  expected  profits.
10This analysis  suggests  that we should  be asking  what it is about  the set of imperfections
faced  by South Asian  farmers  that produces  the inverse  relationship  and how  various  wealth
variables  (including  size)  interact  with this set of imperfections.  Given  South  Asia's enormous
regional  diversity,  it might  be possible  to undertake  a systematic  evaluation  of whether  the
size/wealth-efficiency  relationship  varies  across regions  in a manner  consistent  the economic
environment  in those regions.
Finally,  it is important  to consider  the other  option  available  to small  and marginal  farmers
besides  expansion:  exit  from  the sector. One would  expect  that marginal  farmers  facing  persistent
poverty  by remaining  in agriculture  might  choose  to sell  their remaining  holdings  and/or  curtail
agricultural  labor in favor  of activities  in the rural non-farm  sector,  the urban sector,  or abroad.
Transactions  costs (discussed  below)  may  present  important  constraints  on such decisions.  The
opportunities  available  in other  sectors  also play a role in this decision. South  Asian  countries  are
characterized  by industrial  sectors  with low labor-absorption  with consequent  lack of urban
employment  opportunities,  and have  not experienced  the striking  transformation  from agricultural
to industrial  economies  seen  in East Asia. The relative  importance  of outside  opportunities,
opportunities  within  agriculture,  and land  market  constraints  in the decision  whether  or not to exit
agriculture  is not empirically  established.
(5) Past misguided land reforms have made tenancy unattractive to landowners, leading
to the development of large capital-intensive  farms.  A political  economy approach is essential
for  understanding the failure of land reform efforts and distortions in agricultural input and
outpuit  markets in South Asia.
An important  constraint  on land-abundant  households  leasing  their land  to smallholders  is
actual  or anticipated  legal  problems. It is widely  believed  that, fearful of land-to-the-tiller  reforns,
large  land-owners  have  resorted  to self-cultivation,  perhaps  with ill-secured  sharecroppers  on some
land. Self-cultivation  has been  facilitated  by incentives  to mechanize  provided  by machinery  and
credit  subsidies  (See  Binswanger  et al 1993). This development  is clearly  of concern  from an
equity  perspective.  It is also of concern  from an efficiency  perspective,  if small  farm tenants  are
efficient  users of land  as the evidence  indicates. Thus land reforms  have worsened  the position  of
those  they were designed  to the protect. In addition,  since  the reforms  took the form of "land  to the
tiller",  those not tilling  land  i.e. landless  laborers,  were  not helped  by the reforms. By discouraging
tenancy,  the landless  actually  lost a means  of upward  mobility  in the agriculture  sector. Table 3
reviews  the land reform  record  in various  countries. The general  point is that land  reform  efforts
have  had limited  success,  and the most frequently  cited successful  cases (Korea  and Taiwan)  had
favorable  initial conditions.  Land  redistribution  has typically  not been  effective,  and tenancy
reform  was often  poorly  designed.
11Table  3: Land Regulation  in Various  Countries
Country  Key  Provisions  Exemptions  Impact
Philippines  abolish  share  tenancy  owner  cultivated  areas  decline  in share tenancy  and
rent  controls  landlords  could  retain 7  emergence  of leases
land  ceilings  ha  Increased  evictions
Increased permanent labor
India  ownership  ceilings  owner  cultivated  areas  evictions
prohibitions  on  tenancy  sub-division  amongst  increased  permanent  labor
rent controls  relatives.  Varied  by province  (some
success  in West  Bengal)
Sri Lanka  Landlord  restricted  to  Decline  in share  tenancy  and
25% in share  tenancy  increase  in concealed  50:50
arrangements
Bangladesh  ownership  ceilings  High incidence  of share




Pakistan  Maximum  and  Exemption  for  increased  self-cultivation
minimum  holding  sizes  ownership  of  (particularly  in Punjab)
Resumption  of land  machinery  Enforcement  of ceilings
above  maximum  by  ineffective.
tenants  Some  improvement  in
regulation  of tenancy  conditions  of tenants.
contracts
Thailand  Focus  on establishing  slow  progress  in land




12A related  effect  of land  reforms  is that where  tenancy  has persisted,  it has tended  to be
share  tenancy  rather  than fixed  rent  tenancy. In cases where  legal restrictions  make eviction
difficult,  this creates  a bias  towards  wage contract:  it may be easier  to fire a farm worker  for poor
performance  than it is to evict  a tenant for the same  reason. Many employment  contracts  may in
fact be share tenancy  relationships  (e.g. where  the laborer  is paid  in kind  from crop output). In
addition,  landlords  may rotate  sharecroppers  to a different  plot  each year, to prevent  them  from
establishing  rights  to a particular  plot of land. The sharecropper  faces very poor incentives  under
such an arrangement,  and this is a case  where  the inefficiency  of sharecropping  is likely  to be
manifested.  In these cases,  sharecropping  is practiced  because  the efficient  fixed  rent  contract  is
not available. This may  well  underlie  the empirical  findings  relating  to the relative  efficiency  of
sharecropping  and owner  cultivation.  Repeated  relationships  can  mitigate  moral  hazard  problems
in agricultural  contracts. Legal  restrictions  may also have interfered  with this role.
The apparent  failure  of past land  reforms  is indicative  of the fact that large-scale  land
redistributions  are often  politically  infeasible. This is not to say that all legal reforns in the land
market  have  been a failure. Banerjee  and Ghatak  (1996)  find that Operation  Barga, a program  of
voluntary  registration  by tenants  in West Bengal,  has significantly  improved  agricultural
efficiency.  Registered  tenants  are given  basic security  of tenure;  this could in principle  worsen
moral  hazard problems,  but Banjeree  and Ghatak  find that the dominant  effect is empowerment  -
improvement  in bargaining  power  - of the tenant. This empowerment  is associated  with greater
efficiency.  This indicates  that limited,  but well-designed,  legal  reforms  can have  a beneficial
impact. It would  be useful  to establish  whether  other  apparently  modest  reforms  have had a
similar  impact.
South  Asia features  an asymmetry  between  small  and large farmers  in the political  as well
as the economic  sphere. Indeed,  it is access  to political  power  that has upset the functioning  of key
markets  (notably  land and water)  in South  Asia, and markets  cannot  be studied  in isolation  from
these  political  considerations.  This is reflected  in infrastructure  provision  (notably  water),  and
access  to inputs, subsidies,  and support  services. The interaction  here  is complicated,  because
land  is a source of political  power,  and political  power  provides  to means  to enhance  the return
from  land (as well  as block  attempts  to reform  the land market). The advantages  which  large
'farms enjoyed  in the pre-reform  agriculture  sector  could  persist and translate  into  more  pronounced
land  concentration  in the post reform  era.  The likely  dynamics  of the post-reform  land  market
thus merit special  attention.
Policy  distortions  or market  imperfections  can create  a bias towards  large  farms, allowing
them  to persist as such,  despite  their inefficiency.  Several  examples  can be cited  here. First, price
policy  or farm subsidies  may  favor  larger farmers. Second,  concentrated  land  ownership  may
reduce  the amount  of land  available  for sale  at any time. A feature of Pakistan  more  so than other
South  Asian  countries  is highly  concentrated  land ownership  and an associated  "feudal"  social
structure. Large inefficient  farms  persist  because  their owners  have little  interest  in profit-
maximization.  Land is instead  held  for political  power  or prestige,  and, if sold at all, is sold in
large  parcels  to other  large  landowners.
13(6) Landfragmentation,  as distinguishedfrom  farm  size, is a source ofproductivity  loss,
but these losses have not been quantified, and reasons for  the persistence offragmentation  are
poorly understood.
It seems  clear in principle  that land  fragmentation  would  lower  productivity  by raising
transport  costs between  fields,  and preventing  the realization  of economies  of scale. Additionally,
the hedges  or other  boundaries  between  plots may result in a significant  loss of arable land.
However,  Binswanger  (1994)  cautions  that the influence  of fragmentation  on productivity  can be
overstated. For instance,  in the China  example,  average  farm  size is half a hectare,  fragmented
into an average  of 9 plots. In addition,  land  fragmnentation  may  be an insurance  mechanism  similar
to the practice  of growing  several  different  crops. This argument  was made  by McCloskey  (1976)
in his discussion  of fragmentation  in English  open fields  and is also considered  by Townsend
(1994). The insurance  example  would  indicate  not that there is an imperfection  in the land market
per se, but that imperfections  in other  markets  (specifically,  lack of insurance  markets)  impact  the
land  market. The inability  to smooth  consumption  across  time leads  to income-smoothing  instead
(Morduch,  1995),  with fragmentation  as one income-smoothing  mechanism.
However,  it is doubtful  that all land fragmentation  is for insurance  reasons. Inheritance
rules and legal issues  are also extremely  important. Inheritance  rules  often  call for equal  division
of land between  heirs;' 0 land  can become  further  subdivided  with each  generation,  and family
disputes  may  tie up plots for years. It may be difficult  to consolidate  a farm  within  a family
because  one sibling  lacks  the means  to buy out the others. Family  members  may  be reluctant  to
come  to an informal  arrangement  consolidating  land  use, for fear of losing  their rights  to the land,
and a fornal rental transaction  my be limited  by legal reasons. Consolidation  by sale  to someone
outside  the family  is complicated  by the right of pre-emption  or right of first refusal  which  family
members  enjoy  on inherited  land. Equally  important,  transaction  costs  may inhibit  the transfer  of
small  plots, even  when  all parties  would  be willing  to carry out the transaction. Finally,  for
reasons  already outlined,  land  markets  may  be extremely  thin. An offer  to sell  land  may result  in a
large fall in the price  of land;  the opposite  holds  with an offer  to buy.
Once  we acknowledge  the presence  of transaction  costs,  then  the past history  of land
distribution  becomes  relevant  for understanding  the current situation. There  are a variety  of
reasons  why  a history  of community  land-ownership  may have resulted  in fragmented  plots which
has not been  undone  even  if land  rights  are now  allocated  individually  (Heston  and Kumar, 1983).
Plots of community  land  may have  been  fragmented  for reasons  of "fairness". Furthermore,  if
there were externalities  arising  from  the size of community  land,  then plots may  have  been
fragmented  to increase  their private  cost of withdrawing  from the community  land  system
Thus we have at least three  distinct  hypotheses  explaining  why land  fragmentation  persists
- insurance  reasons,  legal  disputes,  and transactions  costs - and little evidence  with which  to
distinguish  them.  At the same  time, it should  be bome in mind  that farmers  may be using a
variations  in the package  of rights  associated  with land  to undue many  of the negative
consequences  of fragmentation.  Rights  of way can reduce  transport  costs; space  conserving
boundaries  may  be agreed  upon,  and water  allocations  may be jointly determined  by neighboring
plots. The costs of fragmentation,  regardless  of its source,  are also poorly understood.
10 It is not obvious  that  a fairness  criterion  would  in fact  call  for an equal  division.  If fairness  means
equalizing  expected  utility,  this can be achieved  by different  combinations  of expected  return  and risk
(and  whatever  other  moments  are  relevant),  which  can  correspond  to different  holding  sizes.
14(7) Transaction costs are a significant impediment to the functioning  of land markets.  Transfers
of land rights are complicated in South Asian land markets by lack of explicit title to land, and
informal and customary rights.
This hypothesis  can be seen  as either  an independent  hypothesis  or as a byproduct  of the
others,  which are indicative  of substantial  barriers  to access  to land in South  Asia. However,
recent  evidence  does  point  to some  dynamism  in South  Asian  land markets. Recent  trends in
Pakistan  and India  indicate  that middle-sized  farms are taking in land  from those at each end of the
distribution.
Transaction  costs can  be seen as inhibiting  the demand  for, or the supply  of, land. By
transactions  costs,  we include  any cost directly  associated  with the purchase  or sale of land,  such
as valuation  and conveyancy  fees, stamp  duties,  and costs  of meeting  legal requirements  (transport
costs,  obtaining  copies  of forms  etc).  High  transaction  costs in the land  market  impede  land  from
being  acquired  by its most efficient  user unless  initial  conditions  resulted  in the most efficient  user
already  operating  the land. An  important  example  here  is the non-existence  of formal  title  to land
or lack  of certainty  regarding  who  has title to land,  complicating  land  transfers. Disputes  over land
are particularly  prevalent  in the case  of inherited  land.  Difficulties  can also arise  with land  holdings
that exist  in a legal  gray area, notably  holdings  below  some  legal minimum  size  threshold. If
transaction  costs are fixed  costs,  then  they may  inhibit  the transfers of small  plots. This may be
part of the explanation  for the persistence  of land fragmentation.
As already mentioned,  a thin land  market may  impose  significant  transaction  costs on
putative  buyers or sellers. A variety  of market imperfections  may mean  that an offer  to buy or sell
land results  in a significant  change  in the price of land,  rendering  observed  market  prices
meaningless  for many  farmers. Farmers  may be reluctant  to reveal  their valuation  of a potential
purchase  or sale for fear of adversely  affecting  their bargaining  position. Finally,  it may  be that
land  sales are complicated  by the  package  of rights that comes  with the land;  these include  rights-
of-way,  post-harvest  grazing  rights,  and water  rights. The purchase  or sale of land  will  then
necessarily  involve  additional  "stake-holders"  in the  transaction,  raising  costs  and making  the
transaction  more  difficult  to complete.  When  rights come  in this form, it is important  to establish
what is the minimum  bundle  of rights  necessary  for efficient  agricultural  production,  and how
easily  is this bundle  transferred.
Informal  rights should  not necessarily  be seen as an impediment  to a well-functioning  land
market. Indeed,  a potential  problem  relating  to land  rights in the liberalized  environment  is that the
customary  rights on which  farmers  depend  may  be eroded. South Asian  agriculture  has a
considerable  array of customary  rights  (many  of which  protect  smaller  farmers),  which  are not
always recognized  in common  law. These  customary  rights  include  rights of passage,  water
rotation  rights and access  to water  channels,  and grazing  rights. These  rights  provide  favorable
production  and investment  incentives,  and a legal  reform  that fails to account  for these  rights could
be very disruptive.
(8) Land market imperfections have an important gender dimension.  Particularly important is
the separation of management of landfrom  control of land within the household.  A greater
understanding of these issues is a pressing research problem.
15Our focus until  now  has been  on the access  of households  to land. However,  there is
growing  recognition  of the intra-household  inequality  and the need  to pay attention  to decision-
making  at the individual  level. Specifically,  women  often  face worse  circumstances  than men
within  the same  household,  and women  and men  may make  different  decisions. It is well-known
that day-to-day  agricultural  decisions  are often  made  by women,  and that women  have  a crucial
role  in land management. However,  women  often  lack formal  rights  to the land  they  manage.
Autonomy  in decision-making  does  not translate  into control  over resources. For efficiency
reasons  alone,  therefore,  we need  to focus on gender. In addition,  poverty  may  be associated  with
women  more so than men  within  a household,  or with female-headed  households,  so for poverty-
alleviation  purposes,  understanding  the role of women  is important. A closely  related  issue  is
wage-discrimination  against  women  in the market  for hired  labor; once  gender  is playing  some  role
in resource  allocation  in the household,  understanding  womens'  income  sources  is vital.
There is very little  extant  research  examining  how intra-household  decision  making  affects
production  activity,  and we view  it as one of the major  goals of the study  to begin  work  in this
area.  In particular,  there is a need  for information  on the equity  and efficiency  of intra-household
allocations,  their impact  on productivity  and growth,  and the scope  for gender-targeted  policy
interventions.  The success  of gender-targeted  credit interventions  in Bangladesh  and Indonesia
shows  that the payoff  from well-designed  policies  in this area can  be considerable.  In addition,
given  the small  but persuasive  evidence  that an improvement  in land  rights is associated  with
improved  efficiency,  the  gender  aspect  of land rights  deserves  considerable  attention.
It is already apparent  why  we would  expect  stronger  land  rights  to be associated  with
higher  productivity. Secure  land  rights  provide  appropriate  incentives  for production  and
investment  decisions.  They  also improve  access  to credit and other  services. Within  the
household,  there is an additional  dimension:  land  rights affect  bargaining  power  which  affects  the
allocation  of resources. Evidence  that the gender  dimension  of land  rights is important  for
efficiency  has been  presented  by Udry. Using  a detailed  panel from Burkina  Faso, Udry  finds  that
plots controlled  by women  have  significantly  lower  yields  than  those controlled  by men  for the
same  crop and year. This effect  remains  even  after controlling  for land quality,  measurement  error,
and risk management  behavior.
In a sample  from Burkina  Faso, Udry  (1995) estimates  that the effect of a female
cultivator  is to reduce  yields  by over 30 percent  of the average  yield. As he notes,  this violates  the
basic  equalization  of marginal  productivities  that should  govern  Pareto-efficient  intra-household
allocations. The households  in his sample  should reallocate  labor and fertilizer  from men  to
women,  or reallocate  land from  women  to men. Udry  finds  that the differential  is attributable  to
significantly  higher  use of labor  and fertilizer  inputs on plots controlled  by men. Land  rights
appear  to lie at the root of this under-utilization.  Given  the role of women  in making  natural
resource  investments,  the gender  dimension  of land rights may  have an important  role  in land
degradation.  We see it as very important  that these  effects  be quantified.
Women  face  a number  of key constraints  in agricultural  production. They  may not have
access  to equipment  or support  services  (such  as research  and extension).  Household  duties  or
male-controlled  plots may  have  prior claim  on their labor. The credit constraints  we have already
mentioned  may  apply with  particular  severity  to women. Bargaining  power  is important,  but most
difficult  to quantify. Women  with improved  bargaining  power  may be in a better  position  to make
socially  efficient  investments,  for a given  level  of total household  resources.
16Disentangling  the effects  of gender  on efficiency  is important  for effective  policy  design. If
credit  is the major problem,  then  credit  constraints  should  be tackled  directly. If title is the
problem,  then a titling  program  may  be necessary. If bargaining  power  is the problem,  then legal
enforcement  of rights may  have  to be considered,
Conclusion
We conclude  with a discussion  of research  directions  suggested  by this review. It is
arguable  that the significant  regional  variation  in South  Asia has not been  exploited  by researchers
to the fullest  extent. Carefully  designed  research  could  well  find crucial  identifying  variation  in
income,  wealth,  institutions,  policies,  demographic  and sociological  factors  that would  allow  us to
make  inroads on many  unsettled  questions. Where  cross-regional  comparisons  are not possible,
panel data is clearly  essential  so that identification  issues  are less severe. A second  direction
relates  to a group of issues  where  research  has barely  begun. Intra-household  allocations  and land
fragmentation  are the top priorities  in this group.
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